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decree the performance of that [Kentucky] decree, by compelling the conveyance through its process of attachment, but when pleaded in our courts, as a cause of action, or as a ground of defense, it must be regarded as conclusive of all the rights and equities which have been adjudicated and settled therein, unless impeached by fraud." With the holding in the principal case, that the full faith and credit clause is not violated, Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs specially and on somewhat different grounds and Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice BREWER dissent.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—POLICE POWER—LICENSE AND REGISTRATION OF AUTOMOBILES.—Plaintiff, a citizen of New York, while touring in an automobile in New Jersey, was convicted of violating a law of the state of New Jersey (P. L. 1908, p. 615, § 4) requiring the obtaining of a license and the registration of every motor vehicle in the state, and the filing by each non-resident owner of an automobile with the secretary of state of a duly executed instrument constituting the secretary of state his true and lawful attorney, upon whom all processes in all actions caused by the operation of his motor vehicle may be served, and providing that such service shall be treated as of the same effect and force as service upon such non-resident personally. *Held*, the statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state and not a violation of the federal constitution, fourteenth amendment. *Clery v. Johnston*, (1909), — N. J. —, 74 Atl. 538.

The power to require every resident and non-resident owner of an automobile to register the same and procure a driver's license is within the police power of the state. *Unwen v. State*, 73 N. J. L. 529, 64 Atl. 163, affirmed *State v. Unwin*, 75 N. J. L. 500, 68 Atl. 110. Regulations protecting the users of highways, by limiting speed, requiring licenses, lights, and signals have received judicial sanction. *Trenton Horse Railroad Co. v. Trenton*, 24 Vroom. 132; *Cape May R. R. Co. v. Cape May*, 30 Id. 393; *Cape May R. R. Co. v. Cape May*, 30 Id. 396. It is necessary to require operators and owners of automobiles who are non-residents to consent to service of process upon the secretary of state, as service upon them personally, and to agree to answer such service, in order to obtain jurisdiction of them personally and to compel them to answer for their acts; such a provision is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional.

CONTRACTS—RESTRAINT OF TRADE—LIMITATION AS TO TIME.—One of the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties to this suit was that the defendant should refrain from the manufacture and sale of any white or porcelain door knobs until January 1, 1915, a period of more than five years. This term being disregarded by defendant, who proceeded to manufacture and offer for sale such articles, the complainant brought a bill for specific enforcement of the contract by injunction. *Held*, that where it is apparent that the rights of the public will not be prejudiced, a contract in restraint of trade, although unlimited in space, if reasonably limited in time as in this case, will be specifically enforced. *Artistic Porcelain Co. v. Boch* (1909), — N. J. Eq. —, 74 Atl. 680.

The decision announced in *Mitchell v. Reynolds*, 1 P. Wms. 181, to the